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1 Introduction
A central theme in regional and urban economics has been to examine how households
sort themselves into neighborhoods and communities according to various socioeconomic
characteristics, such as income, household size or education. Roughly speaking, the sorting
approach predicts that local jurisdictions should be internally more homogenous than the
larger geographical or economic unit of which they are a part. Also, the jurisdictions
should differ from each other.
However, recent empirical evidence reveals that there is considerable heterogeneity
within municipalities and local neighborhoods. Davidoff (2005), and Epple and Sieg (1999)
find that ca. 90% of the variation of household income in US metropolitan areas can be
explained by within-community variance, and only ca. 10% is accounted for by differences
across jurisdictions. According to Ioannides (2004), in a typical American neighborhood,
neighbors tend to differ significantly in terms of income, age and education, while local
property values are more correlated. These findings are put into a historical perspective
by Rhode and Strumpf (2003), who report that heterogeneity across US municipalities
and counties, measured with respect to income and (so called) public good preference
proxies (including education, age, race, nativity, party vote shares in presidential elections,
owner-occupation rate, and religion) did not increase over the period 1850-1990 although
migration costs fell, which should have made sorting easier.
In this paper we develop a dynamic model of residential sorting, which provides one
possible explanation as to why local jurisdictions may be internally rather heterogenous,
and not very distinct from each other. We also derive a number of empirical predictions
about the degree of sorting under different circumstances and compare these predictions
with observations from US metropolitan areas.
Our approach is based on the following main elements: (i) For owner-occupying house-
holds, housing is both a consumption good and an investment, and location choices involve
both consumption and investment considerations. (ii) Regional house prices fluctuate, and
the capital gains and losses made in the housing market play a major role in determining
how a household’s wealth evolves over time. (iii) Borrowing constraints may prevent a
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household from moving from a currently cheap location to a currently expensive location.
There are two locations in the economy, both having enough housing capacity for half
of the households. In each period, the utility that a household derives from residing in
different locations depends on the household’s current “match”. Empirically, the “match”
can be interpreted as reflecting various demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of
the household (other than wealth) such as education, the age of the household head(s), or
the number of children, which affect housing and location decisions. In each period, one
of the locations is considered being “desirable” while the other location is “less desirable”.
The basic allocation problem arises from the fact that more than one half of the households
(and possibly all of them) derive more utility from residing in the (currently) “desirable”
location, and thus housing is in short supply there.
In equilibrium, a pattern of two-dimensional residential sorting emerges and location
choices depend on both wealth and the “match”. It may be instructive to first have a
brief look at simple polar cases. If residential sorting takes place mainly in the wealth
dimension, the wealthiest households tend to live in the currently popular, and expensive,
location, and those who reside in the unpopular location do so because they cannot afford
a more expensive home; they are borrowing constrained. According to our theory, a
household is currently wealthy (impecunious), because it has been fortunate (unlucky) in
the timing of its housing market transactions; the current wealth position largely reflects
past fortunes in the housing market, rather than some inherent characteristics of the
household. Thus the theory predicts that under wealthwise sorting the locations should
be internally rather heterogenous in the match dimension. Within the same neighborhood
there may be households which have little in common, apart from the value of their home.
In the opposite case, where sorting takes place in the match dimension, those who have
the best current match with the desirable location also live there. Given the empirical
interpretation we attribute to the match, households living within the same jurisdiction
should then resemble each other with respect to various socioeconomic characteristics
(such as household size, the age of the household head(s), or education). Also differ-
ent jurisdictions should differ from each other with respect to the distribution of these
observable characteristics.
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A major objective of the paper is to study under what circumstances sorting hap-
pens primarily in the wealth dimension, and when location choices are made principally
according to the match. Residential sorting in the match dimension requires that the
basic allocation problem in the economy is not mainly solved through the borrowing
constraint, but rather by self-selection. Here self-selection essentially means that some
households, which receive a higher current utility stream from the desirable location, vol-
untarily choose the less desirable area. The incentives to make such a choice arise from
the basic elements (i), (ii) and (iii), underlying our approach, and they reflect a trade-off
between the consumption motive and the investment motive of housing.
To be more specific, we assume that the relative ranking of the locations is not set
once and for all, but with a certain probability there may be a regional shock, so that
the ranking is reversed, and regional house prices change. The regional shock may reflect
e.g. altering labor market conditions, changes in the supply of public goods and services,
or the evolution in the tastes and the needs of the population. Alternatively, the house
price dynamics may be interpreted as reflecting (in a reduced form) the interaction be-
tween housing demand and supply. According to this interpretation, an area is currently
expensive, because housing supply has not yet increased to absorb a positive demand
shock.1
This pattern of house price fluctuations implies that choosing the currently popular
and expensive location today involves the risk of incurring capital losses, if regional house
prices fall, and then facing the borrowing constraint in the future, when the match with the
(then) expensive location may be better than today. By contrast, buying a property in the
currently less popular area provides the opportunity to realize capital gains. Thus while
the currently “desirable” and expensive location is, for most households, more attractive
from the consumption point of view, the currently cheap location offers better investment
opportunities.
The pattern of residential sorting that emerges in equilibrium essentially reflects the
1When the housing supply adjusts, and the demand shock is absorbed, the prices will fall. However,
since construction takes time, and may also require changes in local public policies, such as rezoning, this
may only happen after a long, and random, delay. See Capozza et al. (2004), Evenson (2003) or Mayer
and Somerville (2000).
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relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive of housing. If
regional shocks are large and/or persistent, the consumption motive dominates. The
households make their location choices mainly by comparing current benefit streams.
Since only a small group (always less than one half of the households, perhaps no house-
hold) voluntarily chooses the less desirable location based on the consumption motive
only, the regional allocation of households basically boils down to differences in wealth.
Also, regional house price differences, as well as capital gains and losses realized in the
housing market, are large, compared with typical household wealth.
When regional shocks are small and/or transient, the investment motive is stronger
(in relative terms, compared with the consumption motive). Caring about their future
prospects, many households, which would receive a larger immediate welfare stream from
the desirable location, voluntarily choose the less desirable location, in the hope of mak-
ing capital gains. Typically, a household resides in the desirable location, only if its
current match with that location is truly good. The regional allocation of households
then happens mainly through self-selection, according to the match, rather than based on
wealth differences and borrowing constraints. The fact that many households voluntarily
choose the less desirable location is also reflected in house prices. In equilibrium, regional
house price differences, and capital gains and losses, are small, in comparison with typical
household wealth.
The model produces two main empirical predictions. First, the size of house price
fluctuations should be negatively correlated with the degree of residential sorting in the
match dimension. Second, movers should be more sorted than stayers. We confront these
predictions of the model with data from US metropolitan areas. Consistent with the
predictions, we find that those metropolitan areas, where house price fluctuations have
been large, also tend to have a more diverse mix of different educational, age and income
groups, whereas metropolitan areas where prices have been less volatile tend to have a
less diverse population, with certain age, educational and income categories under- or
overrepresented, compared with the national average.
We also have data concerning the distribution of age, education and income, at the
municipality level, and thus we can examine residential sorting within metropolitan areas.
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We find that metropolitan areas (such as Seattle) where house prices have been volatile
tend to display lower degrees of residential sorting (so that there is heterogeneity within,
rather than between, municipalities) than metropolitan areas (such as Atlanta), where
price swings have been small.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we establish that, among owner-occupying
households, movers are more sorted (with respect to age, education and income) than
stayers. Based on our theory, we interpret these differences as resulting from housing
market related wealth shocks. For example, some stayer households whose characteristics
are ill-suited for their present location, may be unable to move, since, due to a depreciation
in local property values, they have negative housing equity. To further check if this wealth
shock based mechanism might be (a part of) the explanation, we also look at renters (who
are not subject to wealth shocks in the housing market) in our data. Interestingly, we
find that among renters, stayers are more sorted than movers.
As a final result, the model predicts a non-linear relation between wealth and mobility:
households with intermediate wealth levels should be more mobile than poor households
and wealthy households. While we do not address this issue in the empirical part of the
study, Henley (1998) has documented that this humpshaped relationship holds for British
households.
Generally speaking, our theoretical framework combines themes, which are typically
addressed in two separate branches of literature. (i) Most papers in the literature on
residential sorting use static general equilibrium models. Earlier sorting models2 rou-
tinely assumed that households differ with respect to one characteristic only (typically
income), and predicted perfect stratification along that dimension, a prediction clearly in
contradiction to the empirical evidence, cited above. The more recent two-dimensional
sorting models by Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer and
Sieg (2001) are more successful in explaining the data. In these models, households differ
both with respect to income and with respect to tastes, and there is imperfect sorting
along both dimensions. An alternative approach to account for the observed diversity of
2Examples include Ellickson (1971), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1989, 1991),
Henderson (1991) and Wheaton (1993). For a survey, see Ross and Yinger (1999).
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households within jurisdictions is based on the heterogeneity of the housing stock (e.g.,
Nechyba (2000)). In contrast to the present paper, the atemporal nature of these models
means that housing and location choices do not involve investment considerations, and
there is no feed-back from house price fluctuations to household wealth.3 On the other
hand, in the sorting literature, the attractivity of different jurisdictions typically arises
endogenously as a part of the equilibrium (e.g., the supply of local public goods and ser-
vices is determined in a political economy equilibrium), whereas we take the process that
determines the desirability of different locations as given.
(ii) The second branch of literature analyzes housing wealth as an important compo-
nent of a household’s asset portfolio. While the double nature of housing, as a consumption
good and as an investment, and house price fluctuations play an important role here, this
literature essentially focuses on the optimization problem of an individual household, and
the implications for residential sorting are not examined.4
A few recent papers take up a roughly similar mix of issues as we do here. Ortalo-
Magné and Rady (2006a) examine tenure choice and income heterogeneity in booming
cities, where house prices rise, and home-owners, who make capital gains, may choose to
stay put, even when newcomers typically earn higher incomes. The model has two periods
and, with a certain probability, the newcomers enter the city in the second period. The
households differ in one dimension, income/wealth; whereas the first period distribution is
taken as given, the second period distribution is scrambled by the wealth shocks realized
in the housing market. By contrast, we study sorting in two dimensions, wealth and the
match, more in line with Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer
and Sieg (2001).5
3A few papers (e.g., Bénabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996)) analyze sorting in a dynamic
context. Even in these models, however, the households are typically assumed to be renters, and they
are also assumed to choose their location once and for all (in the first period), so that realized capital
gains and losses do not shape the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting.
4Examples include Ranney (1981), Ioannides and Henderson (1983), Poterba (1984), Henderson and
Ioannides (1987), Bruenecker (1997), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Cocco (2005), and Sinai and Souleles
(2005).
5Gyourko et al. (2006) study the influx of high income households into (so called) “superstar cities”,
i.e., prime locations, where land is scarce. Over time, both housing prices and household incomes rise
in these locations, and the “superstar cities” become increasingly distinct from the rest of the economy.
In the model, the driving force behind these processes is population growth, and the evolution of the
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Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) study the joint process of falling house prices and neigh-
borhood change in declining cities. Due to the durability of housing, a negative shock
leads to a sharp fall in housing prices, but only a slow and gradual decline in city size.
Low housing costs in a city attract low-income households. However, in contrast to our
framework, the model assumes away the possibility that capital losses realized in the
housing market may affect residential location choices.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical observations,
which underlie and motivate our modelling approach. The model is developed in Section
3. Section 4, which contains our main theoretical results, shows how the equilibrium
pattern of residential sorting reflects the relative strength of the consumption motive
and the investment motive of housing. The section also establishes a relationship between
house price fluctuations and residential sorting, and compares the degree of sorting among
movers and stayers. To communicate the main ideas in the simplest possible framework,
Sections 3 and 4 assume that after a regional shock, all matches are broken, and new
match realizations are independently drawn; as a consequence, wealth and the match are
independently distributed. In Section 5 we show that the main results still hold when the
match follows a general Markov process, and wealth and the match can be correlated.
Finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical background
2.1 Housing investments, house prices and incomplete markets
The modelling approach we adopt in this paper is consistent with the following observa-
tions:
(1) In most developed countries, owner-occupied housing is the single most important
investment for a typical household. For example, in the late 1990’s, single family owner-
economywide income distribution, in particular the increase in the absolute number of high income
households. The role of capital gains is not addressed. The main focus of the paper is then somewhat
different from that of our study. Whereas Gyourko et al. (2006) focus on long-run trends of income and
housing costs in prime locations with scarce land, we analyze the role of short and medium run house
price fluctuations in shaping the pattern of sorting.
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occupied housing composed 2/3 of household wealth in the UK, 1/3 of household wealth
in the US, and 2/3 of the assets of a US household with median wealth.6
(2) House prices are often highly volatile, and in different regions property values tend
to rise and fall asynchronously, so that also relative regional prices may vary consider-
ably over time. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this finding with price data from four British
regions and US metropolitan areas; in the figures, the country average is normalized to
1.7 Other OECD countries with large regional price fluctuations include Denmark, Fin-
land, Ireland, and Spain. Relative prices can fluctuate significantly even at a more local
level, e.g. between London boroughs. For example, in 1995 average house prices were
3% lower in Hackney than in Greenwich, but in 2001 Hackney was 20% more expensive
than Greenwich8; see also Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003). For similar findings on
the Boston metropolitan area, see Case and Mayer (1996).
(3) While (relative) house prices may vary quite a bit in the short and medium run, in
many cases there appears to be a long-run equilibrium relationship between house prices
in different areas9, or between local house prices and local economic fundamentals, such as
average income or constructions costs10. If prices are currently below (above) the long-run
equilibrium level, they are likely to rise (fall) some time in the future.11
6Banks et al. (2002), Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
7According to Shiller (1993, Ch 5 p. 79) real estate booms and busts in US cities have been regionally
asyncronized and prize movements often dramatic. Del Negro and Otrok (2005) find that, with the
exception of the current housing boom, US house price dynamics have been mainly driven by local or
regional, rather than national, shocks. For further evidence on US prices, see also Case and Shiller (1989),
Malpezzi (1999), Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), or Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005). For British
evidence, see Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), or Cook (2003).
8Source: Land Registry, http://www.landreg.gov.uk.
9That is, regional house prices are cointegrated. For evidence from British regions, see MacDonald
and Taylor (1993), Alexander and Barrow (1994) or Cook (2003). For evidence from US census regions,
as well as for a comparison between the US and the UK, see Meen (2002). Also, Pollakowski and Ray
(1997) find that in the Greater New York metropolitan area, the evolution of local house prices in a
municipality can be predicted using lagged price changes in neighboring jurisdictions. Tirtiroglu (1992)
reports similar findings from Hartford CT.
10For US evidence, see Capozza et al. (2004), Malpezzi (1999), Abraham and Hendershott (1996) or
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994). For British evidence, see Ashworth and Parker (1997). To explain
house price movements in the US and the UK, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006b) present a model, where,
following a permanent income shock, house prices may initially overshoot their new long-run equilibrium
level. In her study of house prices in US metropolitan areas, Evenson (2003) emphasizes the role of
supply, and lags in housing construction.
11The adjustment may take a long time. Factors that slow down the process include high population
density, the scarcity of land, and strict public regulations. See Capozza et al. (2004) or Evenson (2003).
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(4) Capital gains and losses made in the housing market can be remarkably large in
comparison with typical household incomes and savings. To illustrate this point, Table 1
shows maximum and minimum house-price-to-income ratios in four major US cities over
the period 1979-1996. In the UK, the average annual capital gain in the London market
between 1983 and 1988 corresponded to 72% of the mean annual disposable household
income in the UK over that period, and exceeded by the factor of 7.8 average yearly
household savings. Between 1989 and 1992, the annual capital loss of a typical London
homeowner was equivalent to 77% of average disposable household income, and 8.4 times
average household savings.
(5) Empirical studies of household mobility reveal that capital losses made in the
housing market may seriously limit a household’s ability to move from one location to
another. This is the case especially if a household has negative equity, i.e. the value of
the mortgage exceeds the value of the house.12
(6) As a general rule, housing market risks are uninsurable. For example Shiller (1993,
2003) lists home equity insurance as one of the key financial markets currently missing.
Shiller (1993), and Shiller and Weiss (1999) discuss the potential problems, both economic
and psychological, involved in providing hedging against house price swings, as well as
ways to overcome these problems.13
12See Chan (1996, 2001) or Henley (1998).
13In the UK, real estate futures were traded in the London Futures and Options Exchange (London
Fox) in 1991, from May through October. Trading volume was low, and the market was closed when it
was reported that the exchange had allegedly attempted to create a false impression of high trading value
by false trades (Shiller (1993, Ch 1)). In the early 2000’s house price index derivatives were (re)introduced
by two spread betting firms IG Index and City Index (Iacovello and Ortalo-Magné (2003)). The interest
shown by the British public has been minimal and IG Index has already withdrawn the products from
the market.
In the US, there are a few local experiments with home equity insurance. The Oak Park Experiment
has been running since 1977 and the South-West Home Equity Assurance Program was initiated in
1988. Both of these programs are in Chicago and insure homeowners against price declines caused by
neighborhood change. More recently, the Yale/Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Home Equity
Guarantee Project has developed home equity insurance products, to be initially used in Syracuse, New
York. See Shiller (2003, Ch 8).
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2.2 House price fluctuations, household mobility and residential
sorting
To provide a benchmark against which the predictions of the model can be judged, we
study some simple relations between house price fluctuations and residential sorting, and
analyze the degree of sorting among movers and stayers. There is much discussion and
data on large fluctuations in relative house prices in the US metropolitan areas (MSAs).
Also, recent studies (Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006a), Glaeser and Gyourko (2005)) sug-
gest that rising or falling house prices affect the income distribution in a MSA. In a similar
vein, we first ask whether the size of house price fluctuations is related to how much each
MSA’s population structure deviates from the US as a whole. We then move to examine
how house price variations in different MSAs are related to measures of residential sorting
between local municipalities (so called Minor Civil Divisions or MCDs) within each MSA.
MCDs, in particular, have been found to exhibit much less residential sorting than con-
ventional sorting models predict (see Rhode and Strumpf (2003)). Finally, we compare
residential sorting of movers to that of stayers across (so called) Public Use Microdata
Areas (PUMAs) in the whole US.14 This part is related to the work by Ortalo-Magné and
Rady (2006a), who study income distributions among movers and stayers. For a detailed
description of the data and their sources, see the empirical appendix.
The predictions of our model (see Section 4) are consistent with the following empirical
observations. The fourth observation is based on empirical work by Henley (1998) on the
UK.
(P1) MSAs, where house prices have been volatile, tend to have a rather diverse pop-
ulation, with the size of different age, education and income groups largely corresponding
to the national population structure, while MSAs with less volatile prices typically deviate
more from the national population structure, with certain age, education and income cat-
egories over- or underrepresented, compared with the national average. The underlying
OLS regression results are reported on the first three columns of Table 2. The data on
population structure come from the 1990 census. As an indicator of how much a MSA
14Each PUMA has a population of approximately 100 000. For further information, see the appendix.
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where Sm is the share of age, education or income group m in the MSA and S
US
m is the
corresponding share at the national level. As a measure of house price fluctuations we
use the standard deviation of the house price pit of the MSA (i) over the sample period
(1985-2000), where pit = log(Iit/It), Iit is the house price index in MSA i in period t, and
It is the US house price index in period t.
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(P2) There is a negative correlation between the size of house price fluctuations and
the degree of residential sorting within an MSA. That is, MSAs with volatile house prices
tend to exhibit low degrees of residential sorting, with heterogeneity within, rather than
between, municipalities. MSAs with small house price fluctuations tend to display higher
degrees of sorting, so that municipalities differ more clearly from each other with respect
to the distribution of age, education and income. The OLS regression results are reported













|Smk − Smj| (2)
where N is the population of the MSA, Ni is the population of municipality i, Sm is the
share of group m in the MSA and Smi is the share of group m in municipality i. The Gini
coefficient takes values between 0 and 1, with small (large) values associated with low
(high) degrees of sorting. The measure of house price fluctuations is the same as above.17
(P3) Among owner-occupying households, movers are more sorted than stayers. If two
mobile households choose the same jurisdiction, these newcomers typically share some
15The price index data are from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. As an alternative
indicator of the size of house price swings we used the measure maxt(pit)−mint(pit). The OLS regression
results were qualitatively similar.
16See Rhode and Strumpf (2003).
17As we do not have data on municipality level house prices, we cannot study changes in relative prices
within a MSA.
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common characteristics; they also tend to differ from other mobile households, which
choose a different location. By contrast, stayers living within the same jurisdiction tend
to have less in common with each other. The first two columns of Table 3 report the Gini
coefficients for owner-occupying movers and stayers; we classify an individual as a mover,
if (s)he has resided in his/her current home for less than five years. For each characteristic
(age, education, income) and each group (movers and stayers), we have computed a single
Gini coefficient, which describes the degree of residential sorting across PUMAs in the
whole US. Thus, N in (2) now stands for the US population, Ni is the population of
PUMA i, Sm is the share of group m in the US, and Smi is the share of group m in
PUMA i.
Based on our theory, we interpret the low degree of sorting among owner-occupying
stayers as reflecting housing market related wealth shocks. Some households, which would
like to move out of an area where property prices fall, may be unable to do so because
they have negative equity (see observation 5 in Section 2.1). Alternatively, some stayers,
who bought their home when prices were lower, may be unwilling to leave when the area
becomes more expensive. Interestingly, among renters (who do not face these wealth
shocks), the pattern of sorting is reversed: stayers are more sorted than movers; see the
last two columns of Table 3. Some further evidence on sorting among movers and stayers,
together with statistical tests, is provided in the appendix.
(P4) Henley (1998) has documented that in the UK there is a humpshaped relation
between wealth and household mobility. According to Henley (p. 425), “levels of housing
wealth are an important factor in explaining mobility and the relationship between the
two is not linear.” British households with large negative equity are virtually immobile.
Also wealthy households tend to move rather little. Households with intermediate levels
of wealth are the most mobile. See especially Figure 2 in Henley (1998).
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3 The model
3.1 The basics of the economy
We develop a dynamic two-region model of residential sorting, based on the following
main elements. First, the basic allocation problem arises, since in each period one of
the locations is more desirable than the other one, and housing is in short supply in
the popular area. Second, as in the models by Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg
(1999), and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), there is heterogeneity, and sorting, in two
dimensions. In particular, we want to analyze, whether the basic allocation problem can be
(mainly) solved through self-selection, so that there is sorting according to the match (i.e.
socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education or household size), or if borrowing
constraints play a major role, so that there is sorting according to wealth. Third, wealth
dynamics are driven by capital gains and losses made in the housing market. As in Ortalo-
Magné and Rady (2006a), changes in house prices are caused by regional shocks. Fourth,
for a household to care about the house price fluctuations, and to view its home as an
investment, there must be a chance that the household will want to sell its home, and buy
another house, sometime in the future. Here we follow the matching/search literature18
(e.g. Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), Krainer and LeRoy (2002)), in assuming that the
match between a household and a housing location may be broken, and the household
finds it optimal to move.
Our basic assumptions are the following.
The economy has two locations. Each location has an equal, fixed, stock of identical
houses. Each house is occupied by a single household and no one household is ever home-
less. All households are owner-occupyers and there is no rental housing. For convenience,
assume that the stock of houses and the mass of households each comprises a continuum
of size unity.
There are infinite discrete time periods indexed by t = 0, 1, .... In each period, one of
the locations is deemed to be “desirable” while the other one is “less desirable”. When a
18Unlike these models, we do not introduce any search frictions.
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period changes, the relative ranking of the locations is reversed with probability π ∈ (0, 1).
We also consider a small region interpretation of the model, with a continuum of loca-
tions. Then in each period, one half of the locations are “desirable” while the remaining
locations are “less desirable”, and when a period changes, a measure π of the locations
is hit by a regional shock. The long-run equilibrium of the model is essentially identical
under both interpretations.
The households differ in the utility premium they derive from residing in the desirable
location. The household specific component of the premium is captured by the match, θ:
a high realization of θ implies a good match with the currently desirable location, while
a low (negative) realization implies a good match with the less desirable location.19 The
aggregate heterogeneity of households is unchanged over time, and θ has a stationary
distribution, with a cumulative distribution function G(θ), on some support [θL, θH ].




A household with current match θ receives per period utility 1
2
ε+θ, when living in the
currently desirable location. The per period utility of anyone household living in the less
desirable location is −1
2
ε. Here the parameter ε > 0 measures regional welfare differences.
ε also gauges the size of regional shocks: if a location is hit by a shock, the utility stream




ε, or vice versa.
Given these assumptions, all households with a current match θ > −ε derive a positive
utility premium from residing in the desirable location. The measure of these households
is 1−G (−ε) > 1
2
. In particular, if θL > −ε and G (−ε) = 0, all households would rather
live in the popular area. Since the measure of houses in the desirable location is one half,
housing is in short supply in the popular region.
A household’s match may change over time. First, if the neighborhood or jurisdiction
where the household resides is hit by a regional shock, the match between the household
and the location is broken, and a new match is independently drawn from the distribu-
tion function G (θ).20 Second, even if the overall popularity of the jurisdiction remains
19As will become clear below, even households with low realizations of θ may derive a positive premium
from the desirable location. However, even if this is the case, households with low θ loose less if they
reside in the undesirable location than households with higher realizations of θ.
20An underlying premise is that a location which was popular (unpopular) in period t and another
14
unaltered, between periods the match may change for some idiosyncratic, or household
specific, reason21, with probability λ ∈ [0, 1], and the new match is independently drawn
from the distribution G (θ). In particular, the assumption that the match is always inde-
pendently drawn, when there is a regional shock and households’ wealth positions change,
means that wealth and the match are independently distributed. This property simplifies
the analysis. However, for our main results to go through, it is sufficient that the match
sometimes, and somehow, changes, following either a regional or an idiosyncratic shock.
In Section 5, we drop the assumption of independent draws, and the match is allowed
to follow a general Markov process, with possibly different transition dynamics after a
regional and an idiosyncratic shock.
Finally, the households live forever and discount future utilities by a common factor
β ∈ (0, 1).
In any period, the aggregate welfare is maximized, if all households with θ > θm = 0
are allocated to the (currently) desirable location, those with θ < 0 live in the less desirable
location, and the group (always of measure zero, if G is continuous) with θ = 0 is divided
between the locations so that capacity constraints on housing are not violated. In other
words, there is perfect residential sorting according to the match. If this allocation rule
is followed, the aggregate utility in any period is w∗ = 1
2
E[θ | θ ≥ 0].
3.2 Wealth dynamics
In the market outcome, the location choice depends on not only the match, but also on
wealth. In this section, we study how a household’s wealth evolves over time.
The only choice available to the households is whether to own a house in the currently
popular area or in the unpopular area: a household cannot sell a house without buying
another one, and vice versa.22 We choose the minimum feasible level of housing wealth
location which is popular (unpopular) in period t + 1 are likely to be “desirable” (“undesirable”) in
different ways; thus it is plausible to assume that the match that the household had with the period-t
desirable (undesirable) location does not carry over to the period-(t+ 1) desirable (undesirable) area.
21The match changes for similar reasons as in the search models by Wheaton (1990) and Williams
(1995). Examples include change of household size or educational status and evolution in tastes when
members of the household age.
22These properties follow from our basic assumptions: (i) no household can be homeless (being homeless
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as the origin and fix the value of a cheap home to 0. We also normalize the house price
in a popular location to 1. This normalization means that house price swings, as well as
capital gains and losses made in the housing market, are always of size unity. However, we
shall below show how their magnitude under different circumstances can be measured in
a meaningful way, by comparing them with the value of financial assets, and with average
household wealth.
Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that capital gains and losses made in
the housing market (as well as idiosyncratic shocks affecting the match θ) are uninsurable.
The incomplete markets setting we consider here is the simplest possible one. In addition
to owning a home, the households can carry wealth to the future by holding a single
non-interest bearing financial asset, which can be interpreted as outside money. The real
supply of money is M/p, where M is the fixed nominal money supply, and 1/p is the
price of money in terms of housing (in good locations); p is endogenously determined in
equilibrium.
We could also easily introduce pure credit, or inside money and allow the households to
borrow up to a certain limit, without changing any of the results.23 Since the households
have no income sources outside the housing market, the steady state interest rate cannot
be positive; with a positive interest rate, a household with negative initial financial asset
holdings24 exceeds any finite debt limit with a positive probability. Then in the steady
state the interest rate is zero, so that inside and outside money are perfect substitutes.25
These simplifying assumptions (no income sources outside the housing market, and, by
implication, zero interest rate) are adopted so as to focus on the role of capital gains and
losses in wealth dynamics (see observation 4 in Section 2.1).26
would result in very large negative utility), (ii) there is no rental housing, and (iii) the measure of homes
equals the measure of households.
23This possibility is briefly addressed in Section 3.4.
24The (non-degenerate) asset market equilibrium of a pure credit economy (see Hugget 1993) necessarily
involves some households having negative positions.
25See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch 17.10).
26In models which analyze both the evolution of household wealth and recurrent housing choices, it is
rather normal to adopt simplifying assumptions about wealth dynamics. For example Ortalo-Magné and
Rady (2006a, 2006b) abstract from households’ consumption/saving decisions, by assuming that there is
non-housing consumption only in the last period of life, when all accumulated wealth is consumed.
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Denote financial asset holdings by a and let h be housing. h is equal to 1, if the
household owns a house in a desirable location, and equal to 0, if the house is in an
undesirable location. We also define a household’s total wealth (n) , which consists of
both financial wealth (money) and housing wealth
nt = at + ht. (3)
In any given period t, the household’s budget constraint is
ht + at = at−1 + (1− st)ht−1 + st(1− ht−1), (4)
where st is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if there is a regional shock between
periods t− 1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Combining (3) and (4) yields
nt+1 = nt + st+1 (1− 2ht) . (5)
Given our simple wealth dynamics, the household’s wealth position (n) changes if and
only if the household makes a capital gain or suffers a capital loss in the housing market.
If, prior to the shock, the household owned a property in a then unpopular location,
(ht = 0) the household makes a capital gain and climbs one rung in the wealth ladder; if
the house was in an expensive area (ht = 1) before the change of fortunes, the household
suffers a loss and falls one rung down.
There is a lower limit for financial asset holdings amin, that a household is not allowed to
exceed. A simple and fairly natural normalization is adopted here by fixing the minimum
balance to be zero, amin = 0, but allowing a negative minimum balance, say −b, would
just involve a change of origin, without altering the analysis or any of the results.27 Since
the minimum wealth level is n = 0 (the minimum level of housing wealth is 0, and the
minimum level of financial asset holdings is 0) and since households make capital gains
and losses of size unity, we can now assume, without loss of generality, that wealth only
27See Aiyagari (1994) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch. 17.10).
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takes non-negative integer values n = 0, 1, 2, .... At wealth levels n ≥ 1, a household
may freely choose its housing location, and its wealth portfolio may consist of n units
of real money balances and a cheap house (h = 0), or n − 1 units of financial assets and
an expensive home (h = 1). If n = 0, the household owns a house in an undesirable
location, h = 0, and since it has no money, a = amin = 0, it cannot afford a house in a
desirable location: choosing h = 1 would imply a = −1 < amin, and this is not allowed.
The liquidity (or borrowing) constraint that limits a household’s location choices can be
expressed as follows:
ht = 0 if nt = 0. (6)
3.3 The household’s problem
Consider the optimization problem of any one household. At each time t it chooses its


















subject to (5) and (6). The problem can be conveniently presented in a recursive form.
Let V (θ, n) be the (ex post) value function of a household with current type θ and
current wealth n. Also define the household’s ex ante value function V (n) = Eθ [V (θ, n)],
which describes the household’s expected prospects when the household faces a shock
(idiosyncratic or regional) and does not yet know its new match. The value function
V (θ, n) satisfies the Bellman equation








− (1− h) 1
2
ε+ β {(1− π) [(1− λ)V (θ, n) + λV (n)]
+π [(1− h)V (n+ 1) + hV (n− 1)]}
(7)





on its location choice. Its prospects for the next period are discounted by β and are given
inside the curly brackets. With probability (1− π) (1− λ) the household is not exposed
to any shocks, and it will face the same value function V (θ, n) as today. With the
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complementary probability [1− (1− π) (1− λ)] the match is broken and the household’s
prospects are captured by the ex ante value function. If the match changes for household
specific reasons, the wealth of the household remains unaltered and future welfare is given
by V (n). If there is a regional shock, not only the match changes, but also house prices
rise or fall, and depending on housing location, the household makes a capital gain or
suffers a capital loss, resulting in expected future welfare V (n+ 1) or V (n− 1).
At each unconstrained wealth level n ≥ 1, the household chooses the desirable location
if and only if
θ + ε > πβ [V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] . (8)
The condition (8) involves a useful decomposition of the decision problem into the con-
sumption motive, figuring on the left-hand side, and the investment motive, visible on the
right-hand side. The strength of the consumption motive depends only on the current
match θ and the measure of regional disparities ε. If there were no need to care about
the future, all households with θ > −ε would choose the currently desirable region, while
only those with θ < −ε would (voluntarily) live in the less popular area. The downside
of choosing a currently popular and expensive location is that a household may suffer
capital losses, if regional house prices fall, and may then be borrowing constrained in the
future, when the match θ with an expensive location is better than today. By contrast,
opting for a currently less popular and less expensive area entails the chance of making
capital gains. These considerations are captured by the investment motive. Due to the
investment motive, even some households with θ > −ε, i.e. households whose immediate
benefits are higher in the desirable location, may voluntarily choose the unpopular area.
As the right-hand side of (8) indicates, the strength of the investment motive depends on
wealth and it does not depend on the current match.
At each wealth level n, there is then a critical value of the match
θ∗n =

 θH if n = 0−ε+ πβ [V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] if n ≥ 1 (9)
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and the household’s location choice rule assumes a simple threshold form:
h (θ, n) =

 1 if θ > θ
∗
n
0 if θ ≤ θ∗n
(10)





], ε = 1, β = .95, and π = .3. Clearly, θ∗n decreases with n, and wealthier
households are ready to choose the desirable location even with a more modest match.
This is a general property of θ∗n, and it stems from the fact that the ex ante value function
is concave. (Concavity is proved in the appendix.) Also, this finding has a natural inter-
pretation. Assets are valued since they provide the option to make unconstrained choices
in the future. However, if a household is wealthy, additional assets are of less value: the
more assets the household has, the more distant is the prospect of being borrowing con-
strained at some point in the future. To put it differently, the investment motive is more
important for poor households than for wealthy households.




πβ [V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] = 0, (11)
and as a consequence limn→∞θ
∗
n = −ε. In particular, if θL > −ε (and all households
prefer the desirable location from the consumption point of view), there is a wealth level
n < ∞ such that θ∗n < θL for n ≥ n and all households with n ≥ n choose the desirable
location. In Figure 3, θL = −
1
2
> −1 = −ε, and n = 3.
Essentially, the preceding discussion reveals that there is a pattern of two-dimensional
residential sorting:
Proposition 1 Residential sorting takes place both according to the match and according
to wealth. Wealthy households and households with a high match realization tend to choose
the popular location, while poor households and households with a low match realization
live in the less desirable location.
Next we show that the relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment
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motive, as well as location choices, depend on the size and frequency (persistence) of
regional shocks.28
The parameter ε measures interregional welfare differences, and the size of regional
shocks. An increase in ε strengthens the households’ consumption motive to choose the
desirable location in the current period. On the other hand, it also reinforces the incentives
to accumulate assets (investment motive), since a household stands to loose more if it faces
the borrowing constraint at some point in the future. However, since future losses are
discounted and only occur by chance, while the higher welfare stream is available right
away, the effect on the consumption motive dominates. Hence, the larger the regional
differences or shocks, the more likely an unconstrained household chooses the currently
desirable location:





Proof See the appendix.
The parameter π measures the frequency of regional shocks. As π does not affect
the utility streams available in different locations, its changes have no impact on the
consumption motive. However, a change in π affects the investment motive. The higher
π, the more likely a household living in the popular area suffers a capital loss, while the
more likely a household living in the unpopular area makes a capital gain. Then, at any
unconstrained wealth level, a household needs a better match before it chooses to live in
the currently popular location:





Proof See the appendix.
28The household’s location choice rule does not depend on the parameter λ. To understand this finding,
notice that the consumption motive depends only on the current match, while the investment motive is
unaffected, because every time a capital gain or loss is realized, the destruction of the match nullifies the
effects of previous idiosyncratic shocks. The parameter λ does, however, affect the household’s ex post
prospects: differentiating (7) reveals that the more permanent the types are, the more the ex post value
function V (θ, n) depends on the current match. Also, as shown in Section 4.2, it has an effect on the
volume of residential mobility.
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3.4 Equilibrium
The previous section showed how a household chooses its location based on its current
wealth and its current match. On the other hand, a household’s current wealth depends
on its past fortunes in the housing market and its past location choices. Then the long-
run wealth distribution arises as a result of households’ moving policies. Location choices
and the stationary wealth distribution together determine the long run equilibrium of the
model.
Denote by f (n) the size of wealth class n and let fha (n) be the frequency of households
at wealth level n, with house value h ∈ {0, 1} and a = n − h units of financial assets.
If there is a regional shock, all f (n) households which were previously in wealth class n
either go up to n+1 or fall to n−1, depending on their house location. They are replaced
by f 0n−1 (n− 1) class n−1 households which have made a capital gain and f
1
n (n+ 1) class
n+1 households which have suffered a capital loss. The wealth distribution is stationary
if and only if
f (n) ≡ f0n (n) + f
1
n−1 (n) = f
0
n−1 (n− 1) + f
1
n (n+ 1) (12)
for all n. We also consider the model version, with a continuum of atomistic regions.
Between any periods, a measure π of the locations is hit by a regional shock, and the
wealth distribution is stationary if and only if
f (n) = (1− π) f (n) + π
(





It is easy to conclude that (13) reduces to (12): as a consequence, both model variants
have the same long-run wealth distribution and the same long-run equilibrium.29
There are no wealth classes below 0 (i.e., f (n) = 0 for n < 0) and at wealth level 0 the
households can only choose an unpopular location (i.e., f 1−1 (0) = 0). These restrictions
29The environment that an individual household faces is identical in both model variants: there is a
regional shock with probability π. Then the households’ location choices, analyzed in Section 3.3, are
identical in both cases.
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and (12) then imply the sequence
f 0n (n) = f
1
n (n+ 1) , for all n ≥ 0. (14)
In words, each group with n units of financial assets and a cheap home is of equal size as the
group with the same amount of financial assets and an expensive house: the distribution
of financial assets is identical in both locations. This property means that the economy
(as characterized by the distribution of housing wealth and financial assets) looks exactly
the same at the end of any given period and at the beginning of the subsequent period
even if the popularity ranking of the locations is reversed.
To characterize the wealth distribution, note that the households’ location choice rule
(10) implies
f 0n (n) = G (θ
∗
n) f (n) and f
1
n−1 (n) = (1−G (θ
∗
n)) f (n) . (15)
Using (15) in (14) we obtain a recursive equation








, for n = 1, 2, ... (17)
Equation (16) and the sequence γ (n) determine the wealth distribution.30 By (9) we
have G (θ∗0) = G (θH) = 1 and thus γ(1) ≥ 1. On the other hand, γ(n) is decreasing in
n for all n ≥ 1 and limn→∞ γ(n) =
G(−ε)
1−G(−ε)
< 1. Thus, equation (16) indicates that the
wealth distribution is single-peaked, with wealth classes in the middle having more mass
than those on the tails, a property which is consistent with observed empirical wealth
distributions. In particular, limn→∞ f (n) = 0.
31
Next, we proceed to studying the housing market equilibrium. The demand for housing














for n = 0, 1, ..., where γ (0) ≡ 1.
31If θL > −ε, f (n) = 0 for all n > n.
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n−1 (n). Given that the aggregate mass of households is unity∑∞














, h ∈ {0, 1}. (18)
But these equations indicate that the demand for housing, on the left-hand side, is equal to





, in both locations. Households’ location choices combined with
the endogenously arising long-run wealth distribution guarantee that housing markets
clear: If few households willingly choose the less desirable location (in wealth classes




n (n) is small), in the
long-run equilibrium many households end up living there because they are borrowing
constrained (f00 (0) is large).
Given the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, we can analyze what happens to the wealth
distribution when the size or the frequency of regional shocks changes.
Lemma 3 When regional shocks become smaller (ε decreases) or more frequent (π in-
creases), the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance.
Proof Define the cumulative distribution function F (n; ε, π) =
∑n
i=0 f (i). By Lemmas
1 and 2, the θ∗n-schedule shifts up when ε decreases or π increases. This then increases
γ (n) in (17) so that by (16) the ratio f (n+ 1) /f (n) goes up for all n ≥ 0. It follows
that dF (n; ε, π) /dε ≥ 0 and dF (n; ε, π) /dπ ≤ 0, for each n.
Taken together, Lemmas 1-3 allow us to assess whether the housing markets are cleared
mainly through self-selection or through rationing via borrowing constraints.
Remark 1 When regional shocks become smaller (ε decreases) or more frequent (π in-
creases), more households willingly choose the less desirable location, and fewer households
32f0n (n) /f
0
n−1 (n− 1) = f
1





≡ γ̂ (n). Convergence follows, since




live there because of the borrowing constraint.
In addition to the households’ location choice rule and the invariant wealth distribu-
tion, the third constituent of the equilibrium is the relative price of housing and financial





where the left-hand is the aggregate demand for financial assets and the right-hand side
is the net supply, equal to real outside money.33 Using (3) and the housing market
equilibrium condition E [h] = 1
2




, and the relative






Notice that p also measures the monetary size of capital gains and losses made in the
housing market.34
In particular, when π increases, or ε decreases, the investment motive becomes stronger
(in relative terms), driving up the demand for financial assets, and their relative price 1/p.
As a result, the share of financial assets in total wealth, E [a] /E [n] = (E [n]− 1
2
)/E [n] ,
increases, while the share of housing (in popular locations), 1
2
/E [n], decreases. Also
house price fluctuations become smaller, compared with household wealth, and a typical
household is better equipped to withstand capital losses.35
Remark 2 Assume that regional shocks become smaller (ε decreases) or more frequent
(π increases). Then (i) the monetary size of house price fluctuations, p, decreases, and
33The equilibrium we establish here essentially resembles the equilibrium of the simple Bewley-type
model considered by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch 17.10.4), where outside money and inside money
(credit) are perfect substitutes, and the interest rate is zero.
34If the households are allowed to borrow in terms of financial assets, and the borrowing limit, de-
noted in monetary terms, is −B, the asset market equilibrium condition reads E [a] = M+B
p
, and









f(n) = limn→∞ γn =
G(−ε)




converges, and E [n] is always finite.
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(ii) the price fluctuations become smaller compared with household wealth, measured by
average wealth, median wealth, or any other quantile of the wealth distribution.
Proof (i) The result follows from eq. (19) and Lemma 3. (ii) The size of house price
fluctuations is normalized to 1. Lemma 3 implies that average wealth E [n] increases
(decreases) together with π (ε); also any quantile nq of the wealth distribution, where
nq = max{n} such that F (n) ≤ q, q ∈ [0, 1] , increases (or remains constant) when π
increases or ε decreases.
4 Residential sorting
4.1 Main patterns
This section studies the aggregate behavior of the economy. We begin by analyzing
social welfare. Addressing this normative issue will then allow us to characterize the
form of residential sorting emerging in equilibrium, since in the present model high social
welfare is associated with location choices based on the match, rather than wealth. The
ultimate objective of the section is to establish a relation between the size of house price
fluctuations and the pattern of residential sorting, so that the predictions of the model
can be compared with the empirical observations (P1) and (P2) presented in Section 2.2.
As a first step we show that the average match in the desirable location, E [θ | h = 1] ,
can be used as a measure of social welfare. Consider any given period. Since the house-
holds choose their location according to the threshold rule (10), the average utility at
wealth level n is







ε+ E[θ | θ ≥ θ∗n]
)
.
Summing over all wealth classes, and taking into account that
∑













f (n)u (n) =
∞∑
n=1





E [θ | h = 1] . (21)
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An alternative way to approach social welfare is to imagine that a new household
enters the economy. The entrant is assigned to wealth class n with probability f (n), and
its expected intertemporal prospects are then given by the (ex ante) value function V (n).




f (n)V (n) . (22)
The appendix shows that these two measures of social welfare are equivalent, up to a
constant multiplier: W is the present value of a program with a (constant) per-period
payoff w,
W = w/ (1− β) . (23)
This equality is also needed in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Social welfare increases, when (i) the size of regional shocks (ε) decreases,
or (ii) regional shocks become more frequent (π increases).
Proof See the appendix.
Intuitively, social welfare is high, when housing markets are cleared through self-
selection rather than borrowing constraints; see Remark 1. Combing Proposition 2 and
Remark 2 also reveals that small (large) house price fluctuations tend to be associated
with high (low) levels of social welfare.
The normative Proposition 2 is next used as a building block, as we characterize
residential sorting in the match dimension, and the relation between sorting and house
price fluctuations.
Proposition 3 When (i) the size of regional shocks (ε) decreases or (ii) the regional
shocks become more frequent (π increases), the degree of residential sorting in the match
dimension increases in the following sense. (a) In each location h ∈ {0, 1}, the average
match E [θ | h] becomes more distinct from the economywide average E [θ] . (b) The lo-
cations become more distinct from each other and the between-locations variance of the
match increases. (c) The locations become internally more homogenous in the sense that
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the within-location variance of the match decreases.
Proof When conditions (i) and/or (ii) hold, it follows from Proposition 2 thatE [θ | h = 1]
increases. (a) Then, since 1
2
E [θ | h = 1] + 1
2
E [θ | h = 0] = E [θ], and E [θ] is a constant,
it follows that E [θ | h = 0] decreases. Thus the difference |E [θ | h]− E [θ]| increases for
h ∈ {0, 1}. (b) Item (a) implies that the between-locations variance V ar (E [θ | h]) =
1
2
(E [θ | h = 0]− E [θ])2 + 1
2
(E [θ | h = 1]− E [θ])2 increases. (c) The economywide vari-
ance of the match V ar (θ) can be decomposed V ar (θ) = V ar (E [θ | h])+E [V ar (θ | h)] .
Since V ar (θ) is a constant, it follows from item (b) that the within-locations component
E [V ar (θ | h)] must decrease.
Corollary 1 The smaller or the more frequent the regional shocks are, (i) the smaller
are house price fluctuations and (ii) the more residential sorting there is in the match
dimension.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 3 and Remark 2.
Next we proceed to analyzing sorting in the wealth dimension. Above we noted that
the distribution of financial assets is identical in both location types. Then given that
E [a | h = 1] = E [a | h = 0] interregional wealth differences derive entirely from different
house values
E [n | h = 1]− E [n | h = 0] = E [h | h = 1]− E [h | h = 0] = 1. (24)
To assess the magnitude of these interregional wealth differences in a meaningful way, we
compare them with typical household wealth in the economy:
Proposition 4 When regional shocks become larger (ε increases) or less frequent (π de-
creases), interregional wealth differences become larger compared with typical household
wealth, as measured by (economywide) average wealth, median wealth or any other quan-
tile of the (economywide) wealth distribution.
Proof The result follows from equation (24) and Lemma 3.
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The following proposition is about polar cases.
Proposition 5 (a) When ε→ 0 or δ ≡ πβ
1−β(1−π)
→ 1, there is perfect sorting in the match
dimension (and no sorting in the wealth dimension). In any given period, a household




is perfect sorting in the wealth dimension (and no sorting in the match dimension). A
household resides in the less desirable location if and only if it is borrowing constrained.
Proof See the appendix.
The equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, with different values of ε, is illustrated
in Figure 4. In each panel, the cumulative wealth distribution is measured on the hori-
zontal axis, and the cumulative match distribution on the vertical axis. Then area has
a simple frequency mass interpretation (with one quarter of the area of the unit square
corresponding to one quarter of the households etc.). The figure shows a clear pattern,
with the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension decreasing, and the degree
of wealthwise sorting increasing, as the size of the regional shocks grows. Also the mag-




, P ∈ [0, 1], grows together
with the size of the shocks (see Remark 2). Panels a (no shocks) and d (large shocks)
correspond to polar cases, with perfect sorting in the match dimension and in the wealth
dimension, respectively (and no sorting in the complementary dimension). Panels b and
c are intermediate cases, with shocks of intermediate size, and imperfect sorting along
both dimensions. A similar set of figures could be also presented with respect to π.
The pattern of residential sorting that emerges in equilibrium essentially reflects the
relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive of housing. If
the consumption motive dominates (large ε and/or small π), the households choose their
location mainly by comparing current benefit streams, and few of them willingly pick the
less desirable region. Then the regional allocation of households basically boils down to
differences in wealth: typically a household resides in a cheap location if and only if it
cannot afford a more expensive home. When the investment motive is stronger, compared
with the consumption motive (small ε and/or large π), many households, which would
receive a larger immediate welfare stream from the desirable location, voluntarily choose
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the less desirable location, so as to make capital gains, and to avoid capital losses and
future credit constraints. Typically, a household lives in the desirable location only if its
current match with that location is truly good. The regional allocation of households
then happens mainly through self-selection, according to the match, rather than based on
wealth differences and borrowing constraints.
To connect the model to empirics, we invoke the interpretation that the match θ can
be thought of as reflecting various socioeconomic characteristics of the household (other
than wealth) such as age, education, income or household size. Here we address two
implications of the model.36
First, if house price fluctuations are large, the match distribution in an individual
location should roughly replicate the economywide distribution. If price fluctuations are
small, the local match distribution should differ more clearly from the aggregate distrib-
ution. (See Proposition 3, especially item (a), and Corollary 1; see also Figure 4.) These
predictions appear to be roughly consistent with observation (P1): If house prices have
been volatile in a metropolitan area (an individual location), the shares of different age,
education and income groups in the MSA tend to largely correspond to the average shares
in the US (the aggregate economy). If prices have been relatively stable, the MSA tends
to deviate more from the US average.
Second, if house prices are volatile, different locations should have largely similar
match distributions. If house price fluctuations are small, there should be more sorting in
the match dimension, and the locations should differ from each other. (See Proposition
3, especially items (b) and (c) and Corollary 1; see also Figure 4.) These predictions are
largely congruent with observation (P2): The size of house price fluctuations is negatively
correlated with the degree of residential sorting within a metropolitan area. The larger the
house price fluctuations, the less the municipalities (individual locations) within the MSA
(the aggregate economy) tend to differ from each other with respect to age, education
and income.
36As the reader will notice, when linking the locations of the model to real-world economic and geor-
graphical units, two different interpretations of the model are used.
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4.2 Movers and stayers
In our analysis of US data, we observed that, among owner-occupying households, movers
are geographically more sorted than stayers in terms of age, education and income (obser-
vation (P3) in Section 2.2). Also, the empirical mobility literature has found an interesting
non-linear (humpshaped) relationship between wealth and mobility (observation (P4) in
Section 2.2). In this section, we show that the empirical predictions of our model are
consistent with these observations.
We begin by demonstrating a simple humpshaped relation between wealth and mobil-
ity. Take any given wealth class n. At the beginning of any period, the portion 1−G(θ∗n)
of households own a house in the desirable location; since equations (14) hold in the steady
state, this is true even after a regional shock. Between any two periods, (1− s)λ+s house-
holds are hit by a shock, which breaks their match. Then the share ((1− s)λ+ s)G(θ∗n)
of the households, which are in the popular area at the beginning of the period, get a
realization θ < θ∗n and move to the unpopular area. Therefore, mobility from the desirable
to the undesirable location in wealth class n is equal to ((1− s)λ+ s)G(θ∗n)[1− G(θ
∗
n)].
Likewise, it is easy to conclude that mobility from the undesirable to the desirable location
equals the same measure. Then overall mobility in wealth class n is
µ (n) = ((1− s)λ+ s) 2G(θ∗n)[1−G(θ
∗
n)]. (25)
Clearly, there is more mobility in those periods when the economy is hit by a regional
shock and s = 1. Under the atomistic locations interpretation, in any given period,
mobility at wealth level n is µ (n) = ((1− π)λ+ π) 2G(θ∗n)[1 − G(θ
∗
n)]. Notice also that
in the two-region case, µ (n) is the long-run average mobility at wealth level n.
Essentially, µ (n) or µ (n) , defines a humpshaped relation between wealth and mobil-
ity37:
37Notice that the measure µ (n) (or µ (n)) answers the following question: Assume that a household
has wealth n in a given period t. What is the probability that the household moves during the period?
An alternative question might be: What is the probability that the household lives in different locations















. If there is no regional
shock between periods t and t + 1 (that is, st+1 = 0), there is a humpshaped relation between wealth
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Proposition 6 Assume that n ≥ 2. Then (i) mobility is increasing in wealth at low
wealth levels, and decreasing in wealth at high wealth levels, and (ii) households with
intermediate levels of wealth are more mobile than rich households and poor households.
In particular, borrowing constrained households are completely immobile. If θL > −ε, so
that n <∞, all households with n ≥ n are immobile.
Proof Equation (25) implies that the measure of mobility µ (n) (or µ (n)) is a downward
opening parabola, with its peak at G (θm) =
1
2
. Also µ (n) = 0 at the extreme points
G = 0 and G = 1. According to Proposition 1, θ∗n, and thus G (θ
∗
n), is decreasing in n.
Also, G (θ∗n) >
1
2






high levels of n, since limn→∞ θ
∗
n = −ε and G (−ε) <
1
2
. In particular, if θL > −ε we have
G (θ∗n) = 0 for all n ≥ n, where n <∞.
This pattern of mobility essentially reflects the varying strength of the investment
motive at different wealth levels. Rich households, with a weak investment motive, want
to live in the popular location with most match realizations, and only rarely find it optimal
to move. Poor households typically stay in the unpopular location; for the borrowing
constrained this is obviously the only alternative. At intermediate levels of wealth, the
investment motive is neither extremely strong nor very weak; these households choose
the expensive (cheap) location with high (low) realizations of θ, and when the match is
broken, they often find it optimal to change location.
Next we proceed to comparing the degree of residential sorting among movers and
stayers. In any given period, we classify as a mover a household which has moved during
that period. The following results are proved in the appendix.
Proposition 7 (a) In both location types, movers have a better match with their (new)
home region than stayers, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. (b) Movers
are more sorted than stayers in the match dimension.
When interpreting item (a) of the proposition, remember that a good match with a
cheap location means that a household has a low realization of θ.
and mobility, as measured by µ˜ (n). If there is a regional shock (st+1 = 1) , the relation may take many
possible forms, including humpshaped and monotonously increasing.
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Item (a) reflects the fact that those who move from one location to another tend
to have rather strong match-related reasons to make that choice, while those who stay
put may do so largely because they have been lucky or unlucky in the housing market.
For example, households which move from the desirable location to the less desirable
location, choose a cheap area, although they could afford a more expensive house (their
former home). As a result, in a cheap location newcomers tend to have low realizations of
θ. By contrast, at least a part of the old residents live in a cheap area because they have
suffered capital losses in the housing market, and are now borrowing constrained; among
this group there are households with a high realization of θ, and a poor match with the
(currently) unpopular location. Likewise, households which move from a cheap location
to an expensive location tend to have high current realizations of θ, while among old
residents there are households which have a more modest match with the (now) popular
area. These stayers with lower realizations of θ have been lucky in the timing of housing
market transactions: many of them have bought their home before the rise of local house
prices.38 Item (b) is a rather straightforward corollary of item (a). Since movers are
better matched with their home region than stayers in both location types, movers are
obviously more sorted than stayers.
5 More general match dynamics
In this section, we drop the assumption that, after a shock, the match is independently
drawn, and allow the match to follow a general Markov process. Compared with the
basic model, this extension brings about two major changes. First, the strength of the
investment motive now varies with the match, and we can address issues such as attach-
ment to the home region and household specific plans to move. Second, in the long-run
equilibrium, wealth and the match are (typically) correlated, rather than independently
distributed. Empirically, the interpretation that the match may reflect various socioeco-
38More generally, and more formally, the appendix shows that in cheap locations, the wealth distribution
of movers first order stochastically dominates the wealth distribution of stayers, while in the expensive
locations, the opposite is true.
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nomic characteristics of the household becomes more plausible, when the match can be
serially correlated in a general way. While the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting
is more complex than in the basic setting, the main results (Propositions 2, 3 and 4,
Corollary 1) carry over; in particular there is a negative relation between house price
fluctuations and sorting in the match dimension.
There are J ≥ 2 different match realizations. If the match changes for idiosyncratic, or
household specific, reasons (s = 0), the transition probabilities from one match to another
are given by a transition matrix Λ0. If there is a regional shock (s = 1), the transition
probabilities are (possibly) given by a different matrix Λ1.
To guarantee the existence of a stationary joint distribution for wealth and the match,
we adopt the small region interpretation of the model, and assume that there is a con-
tinuum of atomistic locations. In each period, a measure π of the matches is broken
due to regional shocks, and a measure λ for household specific reasons. Let π = ξσ and
λ = (1− ξ)σ, where σ ∈ (0, 1) is the overall probability that the match is broken, and
ξ ∈ (0, 1] measures the relative frequency of regional and idiosyncratic shocks. The para-
meter σ can be interpreted as reflecting the overall degree of turbulence in the economy.
The stationary marginal distribution of the match is defined as the eigenvector associated
with a unit eigenvalue of Λ′, where Λ ≡ (1− ξ) Λ0 + ξΛ1.
39 Notice that if the frequency
of shocks (σ) changes, but the relative probabilities of regional and idiosyncratic shocks
(ξ and 1− ξ) remain constant, the stationary match distribution is unaltered.
Next we proceed to households’ location choices. The value function V (θ, n) satisfies
the Bellman equation








− (1− h) 1
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subject to (6). At any unconstrained wealth level n ≥ 1, the household chooses a currently
39We assume that the matrix Λ is indecomposable, so that it induces a unique long-run match distri-
bution, but otherwise we do not impose any restrictions on the structure of the stochastic matrices Λ0
and Λ1.
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desirable location if and only if










| θ, s = 1
]
. (27)
Importantly, the investment motive, figuring on the right-hand side of (27) now depends
on the current match θ (and on the distribution of future matches θ˜, conditional on the
current match). Thus, unlike in the basic model presented in Section 3, two households
with the same level of wealth n, but a different match, may differ with respect to the
strength of the investment motive.
The following proposition characterizes households’ location choices.
Proposition 1’ (i) For all θ > −ε, there exists n∗ (θ) ≥ 1, such that h (θ, n) = 0 if
n < n∗ (θ) and h (θ, n) = 1 if n ≥ n∗ (θ). (ii) n∗(θH) = 1. (iii) For all θ < −ε, and all n,
h (θ, n) = 0.
Part (i) of the proposition indicates, that conditional on the match, there is perfect
sorting in the wealth dimension. As in the basic model, the investment motive gets
weaker when the household accumulates more assets. Then, given that θ > −ε, wealthy
households reside in expensive locations while poor households live in cheap locations.40
Unlike in the basic model, there is not necessarily perfect sorting in the match dimension,
conditional on wealth. At the ends of the match distribution, location choices are similar
as in the basic model: A household with the highest possible match realization (θH) resides
in a popular location, whenever it can do so (item (ii)).41 Also, households with θ < −ε,
which prefer unpopular locations for consumption reasons, always live in a cheap area.
40Proving this (rather obvious) property is straighforward. Here is a sketch of the proof. Consider a
household facing a finite horizon problem. It can be shown that in any period t, (a) location choices are
characterized by match-specific threshold rules n∗t (θ) and (b) the difference Vt (θ, n+ 1)− Vt (θ, n− 1) is
non-increasing in n, for all θ. These results are first proved for the final period t = T . Moving backward
in time, it is straightforward to prove by induction that (a) and (b) hold in any period t. Finally, when
the time horizon is very long (T →∞), location choices in the early periods approach the optimal choices
in the infinite horizon economy.
41A household with θ > −ε may choose an unpopular location for investment reasons, as it does not
want to be borrowing constrained in the future, when the match may be better than today. Obviously
there is no reason to defer gratification, if the current match is the best possible one. This result is easy
to prove by induction; see footnote 41.
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In the intermediate range θ ∈ (−ε, θH) , it is possible, however, that n
∗ (θi) > n
∗ (θj) for
some θi > θj. Then for n ∈ [n
∗ (θj) , n
∗ (θi)), h (θi, n) = 0 and h (θj, n) = 1; that is, the
household with the lower match realization (θj) resides in an expensive area, while the
household with the higher realization (θi) lives in a cheap area. This possibility arises,
since θi may have a stronger investment motive than θj .
As an example, consider a situation with four match realizations θ1 < −ε < θ2 < θ3 <




ζ 1− 3ζ ζ ζ
1− 3ζ ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ 1− 3ζ
ζ ζ 1− 3ζ ζ


where ζ is very small (close to zero). (For simplicity we assume that λ = 0, so that there
is no need to specify Λ0.) Given the match dynamics Λ1, in numerical simulations it is
easy to pick parameter values {θi}
4
i=1 , ε, π and β, such that n
∗ (θ3) > n
∗ (θ2), although
θ3 > θ2. (Consistent with Proposition 1’, n
∗ (θ4) = 1 and n
∗ (θ1) = ∞.) Here type θ2
has a weak investment motive, since after a regional shock its new match realization is
likely to be θ1 < −ε: these households are attached to the home area, and it is unlikely
that they want to move even if the home region becomes “undesirable”. Then it does not
matter if local house prices fall, since the households do not intend to sell.42 Type θ3 has
a strong investment motive, as it wants to live in an expensive area in the future, when
the match is likely to be θ4 = θH . For these households, a major function of the current
house is to serve as a stepping stone to the future home. As the example illustrates, in
many cases the connection between the match and the strength of the investment motive
may be interpreted as reflecting household specific needs to move. The investment motive
tends to be strong, if the household plans to move in the near future. The investment
motive tends to be weak if the household intends to stay put for a long time.
Next we consider the long-run joint distribution of wealth and the match. As the new
42In a similar vein, Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue that owner-occupation is not risky, if a household
plans to stay put for a long time.
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match is not independently drawn after a shock, in general wealth and the match are not
independently distributed.43
The fact that wealth and the match can be correlated is an appealing feature in the
following sense: In this paper we argue that under wealthwise sorting, regions and local
jurisdictions tend to be internally rather heterogenous in the match dimension (i.e. with
respect to socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education, income or household size).
Preferably, this property should arise endogenously, rather than by assumption. In the
structure of the extended model, there is nothing that rules out the possibility that, say,
high (low) match realizations are overrepresented among wealthy (poor) households. That
is, in principle a high degree of sorting in the wealth dimension could be associated with
a high degree of sorting in the match dimension.
Under perfect sorting in the wealth dimension, the independence of wealth and the
match emerges endogenously. In such a situation, all households at a given wealth level
make the same location choice. However, if location choices do not depend on the match,
also wealth dynamics are independent of θ, and the (long-run) distributions must be in-
dependent. In other words, a household’s current wealth position reflects the household’s
past fortunes in the housing market and bears no relation to the household’s inherent char-
acteristics (captured by the match). In equilibrium households which reside in expensive
locations are wealthier than households which live in cheap locations, but otherwise these
geographically separated groups do not differ: perfect sorting in the wealth dimension is
associated with no sorting in the match dimension. (It is worth reemphasizing that if
there is not perfect sorting in the wealth dimension, wealth and the match are typically
correlated in equilibrium.)
Overall, since the strength of the investment motive can depend on the household’s
match, and since wealth and the match can be correlated, the pattern of residential sorting
that emerges in equilibrium can be quite complex. Nevertheless, the pattern of sorting still
43Correlation arises, since (i) the current wealth position depends on past location choices (and luck),
(ii) past location choices were influenced by past match realizations, and (iii) the current match is corre-
lated with past match realizations. The vector difference equation, which implicitly defines the long-run
joint distribution is presented in the appendix. The appendix also establishes the equilibrium of the
model.
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reflects the relative importance of the consumption motive and the investment motive in
the location choice. The appendix proves that the main results of the paper, Propositions
2, 3 and 4, and Corollary 1, still hold, with the exception that π is substituted by σ. If
λ = 0, so that there are no idiosyncratic shocks, these results hold verbatim.
6 Conclusions
Recent empirical evidence indicates that local jurisdictions are internally more heteroge-
nous, and less distinct from each other, than standard economic models of residential
sorting predict. Motivated by these findings, this paper developed a dynamic model
of two-dimensional sorting, with the following main properties. (i) A household’s loca-
tion choice depends both on its current wealth, and on its current “match”, where the
“match” may reflect various socioeconomic characteristics of the household. (ii) For an
owner-occupying household, a house is both a consumption good and an investment, and
location choice involves both aspects. (iii) Regional house prices fluctuate, and the result-
ing capital gains and losses affect household wealth. (iv) After suffering capital losses, a
household may face a borrowing constraint, which prevents mobility from a cheap housing
location to an expensive location.
The pattern of residential sorting that emerges in equilibrium depends on the relative
strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive of housing. The potency
of these two motives is shown to depend on the size of and frequency (or persistence) of
regional shocks. (When regional shocks, which affect the benefit streams available in the
different locations, are large, or when these shocks are persistent, the consumption motive
is strong in comparison with the investment motive.) When the consumption motive is
strong, in comparison with the investment motive, the households essentially care about
today, rather than worry about tomorrow. Then residential sorting takes place primarily
in the wealth dimension. In each period, the wealthiest households live in the currently
desirable, and expensive locations, while those who reside in the less popular areas do
so because they cannot afford a more expensive home. With this pattern of wealthwise
sorting, neighborhoods or local jurisdictions are internally heterogenous with respect to
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socioeconomic characteristics other than wealth: neighbors may have little in common
apart from the value of their home.
When the investment motive is strong, compared with the consumption motive, there
is sorting according to the match. Households, which care about their future prospects,
voluntarily choose a location which is currently unpopular and cheap, but where property
values may rise in the future, and only live in the currently popular area, when their
match with that location is truly good. Then, given the empirical interpretation of the
match, neighbors should be alike.
The model produces two main empirical predictions. First, the size of house price
fluctuations should be negatively correlated with the degree residential sorting in the
match dimension. Second, movers should be more sorted than stayers. These predictions
are consistent with evidence from US metropolitan areas when income, age and education
are used as proxies for the “match”.
Mathematical Appendix
Location choice
The household’s decision problem boils down to the choice of the sequence of optimal
thresholds θ∗n. Since xn = G (θ
∗
n) is a monotonous function of θ
∗
n, also xn can be treated
as a choice variable, and the household’s decision problem (equations (7)-(10)) can be
summarized by the following Bellman equation
V (n) = max
xn
u(xn) + β {(1− π)V (n) + π [xnV (n+ 1) + (1− xn)V (n− 1)]} , (28)

















Thus (28) defines a maximization problem with a concave objective function and linear
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constraints. As a consequence the value function V (n) is concave.
We also show that the condition (11) holds, or equivalently limn→∞θ
∗





> −ε. Since θ∗n is a non-increasing sequence, and, by assumption, the















for all finite, positive integers k ≥ 1. But then limn→∞ (un+k − un) = 0 for all k ≥ 1. As a
consequence, limn→∞ [V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] = 0, and limn→∞ θ
∗
n = −ε. A contradiction.
Let v (n) ≡ V (n+ 1)−V (n− 1) and ∆xn ≡ xn+1−xn−1; since θ
∗
n is a non-increasing
sequence, ∆xn ∈ [−1, 0]. Also define the operator L
L [z (n)] ≡ (1− π) z (n) + π [xn+1z (n+ 1) + (1− xn−1) z (n− 1)] ,
where z (n) is a generic function of n. Since V (n) satisfies the recursive equation (28),




G−1 (x) dx−∆xnε+ βL [v (n)] . (29)
Finally, the expression for θ∗n, eq. (9) can be rewritten as θ
∗
n = Q (n; ε, π) ≡ −ε+ πβv (n)
for n ≥ 1.
Proof of Lemma 1 Define qε (n) ≡ dv(n)
dε
. Differentiating (29) yields qε (n) = −∆xn +
βL [qε (n)]. (Notice that indirect effects can be ignored due to the envelope theorem.) Let
qεmax ≡ max q
ε (n) and nε ≡ argmax qε (n). Now qεmax ≤ −∆xnε +βq
ε
















Proof of Lemma 2 Define qπ (n) = d[πv(n)]
dπ
. Then multiplying both sides of (29) by
π, differentiating the resulting equation by π, and simplifying, yields qπ (n) = (1− β) v (n)+
βL [qπ (n)]. Let qπmin ≡ min q (n) and n
π = argmin q (n). Now qπmin ≥ (1− β) v (n
π) +















βqπ (n) ≥ βqπmin > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2
(i) We begin by deriving equation (23), which is needed in the proof of the proposition.
Using vector notation, equation (28) can be rewritten as follows
V = max
{xn}
u+ β [(1− π) I + πA]V (30)
for n ≥ 1 (and x0 = 1) where V is the (ex ante) value function, stacked as a column
vector, u is a column vector with elements un = u (xn) , and A is a transition matrix,
with elements Ai,j = 1 − xi if j = i − 1, Ai,j = xi if j = i + 1 and Ai,j = 0 otherwise.
Premultiplying both sides of (30) by the stationary wealth distribution f ′ yields f ′V =
f ′u + f ′β [(1− π) I + πA]V. The distribution f is induced by the transition matrix A,
and it satisfies the equation f ′A = f ′. But then w = f ′u = (1− β) f ′V = (1− β)W.
(ii) As proving the proposition with respect to π and ε involves the same steps, we

































Equality (a) involves a decomposition into the direct effect and the indirect effect. (b)
follows from the fact that w does not depend directly on π and ε (see (21)), and thus
∂w
∂ρ
= 0. (c) follows from equality (23). (d) uses the definition ofW, (22), and the envelope
theorem: since the threshold θ∗n, and thus also xn, is optimally chosen in all wealth classes
n ≥ 1, a small policy change does not affect the value function V (n).
By Lemma 3 we know that the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance, when π increases or ε decreases. As the value function



















Proof of Proposition 5
(a) Match dimension. The household chooses {xn}, so as to maximize the value function
V, where V satisfies the recursive equation V = δAV +(1− δ) u
1−β
. (This equation follows







t = 1⊗f ′ (where ⊗ is Kronecker product). Thus when π → 1 and β → 1,
so that δ → 1, maximizing V becomes essentially equivalent to maximizing f ′u = w =
1
2
E [θ | h = 1]. The objective function w = 1
2
E [θ | h = 1] is maximized iff there is perfect
sorting in the match dimension.
(b) Sorting in the wealth dimension. The putative equilibrium strategy is of the
following form: h (0, θ) = 0 for all θ (due to the borrowing constraint), h (n, θ) = 1 for all
θ and n ≥ 1. Then in equilibrium f0 = f1 =
1
2
and fn = 0 for all n ≥ 2.
Given this strategy, it is easy to calculate the ex ante values of the program V (n)
at different wealth levels n ≥ 0. In particular, one can show that V (2) − V (0) =
(1− δ) ε+E[θ]
1−β
. Given the optimal location choice rule (8), the putative strategy is optimal
for the household iff it always prefers the desirable location at wealth level n = 1, i.e., iff
θ + ε > πβ [V (2)− V (0)] = πβ (1− δ)
ε+ E [θ]
1− β
for all θ. (31)
In particular, the condition (31) must hold for the lowest possible realization of the match
θL. Inserting θ = θL, and slightly manipulating (31), yields the condition for residential




Proof of Proposition 7
(a) We define cumulative distribution functions G (θ | h,m) separately for four groups,
conditioning on the households present location (h ∈ {0, 1}), and on whether the house-
hold has moved in the present period (m = 1, if the household has moved, and m = 0,
if the household has not moved). So, for example, G (θ | h = 0,m = 1) is the distribu-
tion function for those households, which moved at the beginning of the period (from an
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expensive location) and currently live in a cheap location. We also define the functions
DG (θ | h) ≡ G (θ | h,m = 1)−G (θ | h,m = 0) , h ∈ {0, 1} (32)
which allow us to compare (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) the distrib-
utions of newcomers and old residents, who live in the same location (0 or 1).
To prove the proposition, we need to construct G (θ | h,m), h,m ∈ {0, 1}.
(i) As a first step, we characterize the match distributions of households living in the
desirable and in the undesirable location, conditional on wealth class n. Given the thresh-
old location choice rule (10), the distribution in the desirable location G (θ | h = 1, n) =
G (θ | θ ≥ θ∗n) =
G(θ)−G(θ∗n)
1−G(θ∗n)
for θ ≥ θ∗n (and 0 for θ < θ
∗
n) is left-truncated, with trun-
cation point θ∗n, while the distribution in the undesirable location G (θ | h = 0, n) =
G (θ | θ < θ∗n) =
G(θ)
G(θ∗n)
for θ ≤ θ∗n (and 1 for θ > θ
∗
n) is right-truncated with the same
truncation point θ∗n. It is easy to see that
∂G(θ|θ≥θ∗n)
∂θ∗n




≤ 0 for all θ.
This property means that if we compare two wealth levels n1 and n2, such that n1 < n2,
and consequently θ∗n1 > θ
∗
n2
, the higher threshold θ∗n1 in group n1 implies that the distri-
bution G (θ | h, n1) first-order stochastically dominates the distribution G (θ | h, n2) for
h ∈ {0, 1}. More formally
G (θ | h, n1) ≤ G (θ | h, n2) for all θ, when n1 < n2 and h ∈ {0, 1}. (33)
(ii) As a second step, we need to study the conditional wealth distributions, contingent
on housing location and mobility. The main objective is to establish a first-order stochastic
dominance relation between movers and stayers in each location.
Denote the mass of households with wealth n, and group (h,m) , by ϕhm (n). Now






n (n) {(1− s) [(1− λ) + λG (θ
∗
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∗
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m (i) be the relative share of wealth class n in group (h,m).
Next, to compare the wealth distributions, we need the size ratios of adjacent wealth
classes in different groups. Denote γ̂hm (n) ≡ ϕ̂
h
m (n+ 1) /ϕ̂
h
m (n) = ϕ
h
m (n+ 1) /ϕ
h
m (n).


























) ≥ 1 (36)























≥ 1. The inequality (35) allows us to com-
pare the wealth distributions of mover and stayer households, which currently reside in
the cheap location. The inequality tells that, for any adjacent wealth classes (n + 1)
and n, the ratio ϕ̂0m (n+ 1) /ϕ̂
0
m (n) is larger for movers than for stayers. But this means
that in the cheap location newcomers are wealthier than the old residents, in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance. The inequality (36) then implies that in the expensive
location the opposite is true, and old residents are wealthier than newcomers, in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance.
(iii) As a final step, we combine the results of steps (i) and (ii), and construct the
conditional match distribution functions
G (θ | h,m) =
∑
n
ϕ̂hm (n)G (θ | h, n) , for h,m ∈ {0, 1} . (37)
That is, the conditional match distributions G (θ | h,m) are convex combinations of the
location-contingent distributions G (θ | h, n) at different wealth levels n. In each group
(h,m), the weight assigned to the distribution function G (θ | h, n) corresponds to the
relative size of wealth class n in the group, ϕ̂hm (n).
Using (32) and (37), we get








G (θ | h = 0, n) ≥ 0,








G (θ | h = 1, n) ≤ 0
(38)
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for all θ. The inequalities follow from stochastic dominance, results (33), (35) and (36).
The expressions (38) mean that in a currently cheap location, the match distribution of
old residents stochastically dominates the match distribution of newcomers, while the in
a currently expensive location the opposite is true. Thus we have proved that in both
areas movers (with m = 1) tend to have a better match with the location than stayers
(m = 0). (Remember, that a low (negative) realization of θ implies a good match with a
currently unpopular location).
(b) To address the degree of residential sorting among movers and stayers, we further
defineDG (θ | m) ≡ G (θ | h = 1,m)−G (θ | h = 0,m) , m ∈ {0, 1} . ThenDG (θ | m = 1)
tells how the distribution of households which have moved from a cheap location to an
expensive location differs from the distribution of those households which have moved the
other way round; also DG (θ | m = 0) allows us to compare the distributions of immobile
households living in different locations. Finally, to compare the degree of residential
sorting between movers and stayer, we define the function RSm/s (θ) ≡ DG (θ | m = 1)−
DG (θ | m = 0). It is clear than both among movers and among stayers, those who live in
the desirable location typically have a higher value of θ than those who reside in the less
desirable location, that is DG (θ | m) ≤ 0 for all θ and for m ∈ {0, 1}. Now we use the
function RSm/s (θ) to address the question: among which group (movers or stayers) are
the households residing in different locations more distinct from each other. In particular,
if RSm/s (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ, movers are more sorted in this sense. But
RSm/s (θ) = DG (θ | m = 1)−DG (θ | m = 0)
= G (θ | h = 1,m = 1)−G (θ | h = 0,m = 1)
− [G (θ | h = 1,m = 0)−G (θ | h = 0,m = 0)]
= DG (θ | h = 1)−DG (θ | h = 0) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from (38).
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More general match dynamics
Let v (θ, n) ≡ V (θ, n+ 1)− V (θ, n− 1) and ∆h (θ, n) ≡ h (θ, n+ 1)− h (θ, n− 1). Also
define the operator L̂,


















| θ, s = 1
]
,
where z (θ, n) is a generic function of θ and n. Since V (θ, n) satisfies the Bellman equation
(26), the function v (θ, n) satisfies the recursive equation
v (θ, n) = ∆h (θ, n) (ε+ θ) + βL̂ [v (θ, n)] . (39)
For all θ and all n ≥ 1, the household’s location choice rule assumes the form h (θ, n) = 1 iff






| θ, s = 1
]
.
Lemma 1’ For all θ and n ≥ 1, dQ̂(θ,n;ε,σ)
dε
< 0.
Proof Define q̂ε (θ, n) ≡ dv(θ,n)
dε
. Differentiating (39) with respect to ε shows that q̂ε (θ, n)
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Lemma 2’ For all θ and n ≥ 1, dQ̂(θ,n;ε,σ)
dσ
> 0.
Proof Define q̂σ (θ, n) ≡ d[σv(θ,n)]
dσ
. Multiplying both sides of (39) by σ, differentiating
with respect to σ, and simplifying, shows that q̂σ (θ, n) satisfies the equation q̂σ (θ, n) =
(1− β) v (θ, n)+βL̂ [q̂σ (θ, n)]. Next define q̂σmin ≡ min q̂






≡ argmin q̂σ (θ, n).


































| θ, s = 1
]
≥ ξβq̂σmin > 0.
Stationary distribution. Let f̂n (θj) denote the long-run frequency mass of house-
holds with match θj and wealth n, and let f̂n be a J × 1 vector, with the jth element
f̂n (θj) . Also let Hn, n ≥ 1, be a J × J diagonal matrix, with the jth diagonal element
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h (θj , n) (and all off-diagonal elements equal to 0), and let Bn = I −Hn. The stationary
distribution satisfies the following set of recursive equations











for all n = 0, 1... Simplifying yields









Notice in particular that the parameters ε and σ do not appear in (40), and thus the
joint distribution of wealth and the match depends on these parameters only indirectly,
through changes in policies.
Equilibrium. Postmultiplying both sides of equation (40) by the unit vector 1, and
taking into account the fact that Λ01 =Λ11 = 1, yields a set of recursive equations for
the marginal distribution of wealth
f (n) = f 0n−1 (n− 1) + f
1
n (n+ 1) (41)
where f (n) = f̂ ′n1 is the frequency mass of households at wealth level n, f
0
n (n) = f̂
′
nBn1 is
the mass of households at wealth level n residing in an unpopular location, and f 1n−1 (n) =
f̂ ′nHn1 is the mass of households at wealth level n residing in a popular location. But
equation (41) is identical to equation (12) so that equilibrium follows in the same way as
in Section 3.3.
Lemma 3’ Define the cumulative distribution function F̂ (θj , n; ε, σ) =
∑n
i=0 f̂i (θj).
Then dF̂ (θj ,n;ε,σ)
dε
≥ 0 and dF̂ (θj ,n;ε,σ)
dσ
≤ 0 for all n and θj.
Proof Define a history as a collection of match realizations and regional shock realizations
Ht = {(θτ , sτ)}
t
τ=0. Notice that histories are exogenous in the sense that they do not
depend on the households’ location choices. Denote a state by y = (θ, n). Consider two
location choice rules h0 and h1 such that for some state ŷ, h0(ŷ) = 0 and h1(ŷ) = 1, and
for all other states y = ŷ, h0(y) = h1(y) = h(y) (where h(y) is the common policy).
Next notice that there is a mapping from histories Ht to states yt, conditional on
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policy hi, i ∈ {0, 1}. That is, at any date t, the household’s wealth nit = n
i (Ht) and the
state yit = y
i (Ht), where i ∈ {0, 1} refers to the policy that the household follows.
Consider two households. Household 0 follows policy h0, while household 1 follows









∆νt ≡ νt+1 − νt = 2st+1(h
1(y1t )− h
0(y0t )) ∈ {−2, 0, 2}. (42)




t . Given the properties of h
0
and h1 it is evident that
∆νt ∈ {0, 2}, if νt = 0. (43)




t = ŷ and st+1 = 1). Next, assume the households have the same
initial wealth, ν0 = 0. From (42) and (43) it follows that νt = 2k, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} for
all t = 0, 1, 2, ... The essential finding is that, given identical histories and equal initial
wealth, household 1 cannot be wealthier than household 0.
Assume that there is a population of households following policy h0, and another
population following policy h1. Also assume that all households, in either population, have
the same initial wealth. As above, we refer to a household belonging to population 0 (1)
as household 0 (1). Now, the proof of the lemma derives from the following observations.
(i) After any given (common) history Ht, household 0 is at least as wealthy as household
1. (ii) After any given (common) history Ht, household 0 and household 1 have the same
match. (iii) The probability distribution over the histories does not depend on policy.
(iv) In any period t, and for any given current match, the wealth distribution under
policy h0 stochastically dominates the wealth distribution under policy h1. (v) When
t→∞, the wealth distribution converges to the stationary distribution. Thus stochastic
dominance applies to the stationary distribution. Finally, Lemmas 1’ and 2’ imply that
when ε increases or σ decreases, the households may shift from policy h0 to policy h1, but
the opposite shift (from policy h1 to policy h0) never happens.
Proposition 2’ When ε decreases or σ increases, social welfare grows.
Proof Let us define a KJ state Markov chain y, where the (nJ + j)th state is given by
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the pair (θj, n). Notice that K (the number of wealth levels) is n + 1, if θL > −ε, and
otherwise K = ∞. Let h be a KJ × 1 vector, with the (nJ + j)th element h (θj , n).
Further define a KJ × KJ diagonal matrix H, with the vector h on the diagonal (and
all off-diagonal elements equal to zero), and let the KJ ×KJ matrix Â be the transition
matrix of the Markov chain y.
The value function can be presented as a KJ × 1 vector V̂ , where the (nJ + j)th
element is the value of the household’s program in state (θj , n). V̂ satisfies the Bellman
equation









(1− σ) I + σÂ
]
V̂ , (44)
where θ is the J×1 vector of types θj. The stationary distribution of y is a KJ×1 vector
f̂ . The distribution is induced by the transition matrix Â and it satisfies the equation






f̂n (θj) h (θj, n) θj = f̂
′H (1K ⊗ θ) =
1
2






f̂n (θj)V (θj , n) = f̂
′V̂
Next we premultiply both sides of (44) by f̂ ′. Then using the fact that f̂ ′ = f̂ ′Â, and






= 0, by the housing market equilibrium, yields
Ŵ = ŵ + βŴ ⇔ Ŵ = ŵ/ (1− β) . (45)
Given the equation (45), and Lemma 3’, Proposition 2’ can be proved following the same
steps as in the proof of Proposition 2. See part (ii) of the proof.
Proposition 3’ When ε increases or σ decreases, the degree of residential sorting in the
match dimension decreases in the sense explained in Proposition 3.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 2’. See the proof of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1’ There is a negative relation between the size of house price fluctuations
and the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension.
Proposition 4’ When ε increases or σ decreases, the degree of residential sorting in the
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wealth dimension increases in the sense explained in Proposition 4.
Proof The results follows from Lemma 3’. See the proof of Proposition 4.
Empirical Appendix
Further statistical evidence
This appendix provides additional evidence as to how movers tend to be more sorted than
stayers.
If movers are more sorted than stayers, then we expect that educational attainment,
age and income are more dispersed across regions among movers than among stayers.
Table 4 reports standard deviations over PUMA regions of the share of home-owners
with a high school degree and the share of home-owners with at least a college degree,
separately for movers and stayers. Clearly, both of the shares vary more across regions
among movers than among stayers; and these differences are also statistically significant,
as shown by the p-values of the Levene (1960) and the Brown-Forsythe (1974) tests for
equal variance. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that owner-occupying movers’ age and income
vary more across PUMA areas than those of stayers. As a robustness check, Table 4 also
makes the same comparisons for people that live in rental housing. Because renters do
not face similar housing market related wealth shocks as owners, moving renters need not
be more sorted than staying renters. Consistent with this, the results of Table 4 indicate
that moving renters are, in the most part, no more sorted than staying renters (and, in
fact, the reverse can also be true).
As a final piece of evidence, we compare “short distance movers”, i.e. households
which have moved within the same metropolitan area, and “long distance movers”, i.e.
households, which have moved from another metropolitan area.44 Because “long distance
movers” have more likely moved between two uncorrelated markets (so that the prices
of the old and the new home may have evolved very differently), they should be more
44We also use data on people that have moved from or to a non-MSA region. See the subsequent
appendix for more details.
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sorted than “short distance movers”. The Gini coefficients reported in Table 5 indicate
that among owner-occupiers “long distance movers” are indeed more sorted than “short
distance movers”, according to all three criteria.
Definitions of variables
Sorting measures computed from ICPSR data
The sorting measures applied in Table 2 are computed from extraction of data from the
1990 decennial Census, published in the ICPSR study 2889 (1990). Table 2 applies the
data set 2 (DS2) where each variable is aggregated to the municipality (MCD) level.
Because MCDs are geographically comprehensive, our MSA level observations are formed
by summing up all relevant MCD level data.
The groups of types that we use in computing the DV measures and the Gini coef-
ficients in Table 2 are as follows. We use five categories for age: (1) “children” (those
of 0-15 years old), (2) “youth” (16-24 years old), (3) “adults, early career” (25-44 years
old), (4) “adults, late career” (45-64 years old), and (5) “seniors” (those at least 65 years
old). For education, we have three groups: (1) less than a high school degree, (2) at least
a high school degree but not a college degree, and (3) a college degree or more. The
Census defines the education groups for only those who are at least 25 years old. This
age category is used to normalize the education groups within each region. Finally, for
income we apply all the 25 income groups available in the ICPSR study 2889. In each
of the cases, the US level groups are obtained by a population weighted average of the
MSA level groups. The education and income categories applied here are similar to those
of the Gini coefficients considered by Rhode and Strumpf (2003, p. 1660) (see also their
Data Appendix at www.unc.edu/~cigar/ or www.unc.edu/~prhode/).
The samples of observations applied in Table 2 derive from all those MSA level matches
that we find between the house price volatility measure and the sorting measures in each
case.
Sorting measures computed from IPUMS data
The sorting measures applied in Tables 3, 4 and 5 are computed from the Census data
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provided at www.ipums.org. The web site provides detailed definitions for each variable.
For each observation unit (i.e., person) in the 1% sample from the 1990 Census, we down-
loaded household id (SERIAL), age (AGE), educational attainment (EDUC99), house-
hold income (FTOTINC), tenure (OWNERSHP), migration information (MIGRATE5,
MIGMET5, MIGPLAC5) and location indicators (PUMA, STATEFIP, METAREA).
These data include observations on 2, 479, 568 persons from 1760 different PUMAs. The
actual number of people in each PUMA is also obtained from www.ipums.org.
To compute the Gini coefficients in Table 3, we first classify each sample person into
four categories depending on whether the person is an owner (OWNERSHP = 10) or
a renter (OWNERSHP = 20) and whether the person is a mover (MIGRATE5 = 2)
or a stayer (MIGRATE5 = 1). Persons with missing observations on OWNERSHP or
MIGRATE5 are excluded from the calculations. To compute the Gini coefficients for
age, education and income we apply similar categories as in Table 2. For computing
the Gini coefficient for age, we estimate the shares of “children”, “youth”, etc. in each
PUMA by computing the relative shares of the sample persons belonging to the relevant
age category (for “children” the share of those 0-15 years old, etc.). For computing the
education Gini coefficient, we restrict the sample to those at least 25 years old. The three
education groups (consistent with those in Table 2) are formed by (1) EDUC99 ≤ 9, (2)
10 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 11, and (3) 12 ≤ EDUC99. Finally, to compute the Gini coefficient for
income, we first restrict the sample to household heads only (SERIAL = 1). Then we
employ FTOTINC to classify each household into one of the 25 income ranges used in the
ICPSR data, and compute the corresponding relative shares in each PUMA. In all cases
(age, education and income), the US level shares are obtained as a population weighted
average of the PUMA shares.
The PUMA observations of the variables considered in Table 4 are computed for house-
hold heads only, while the applied groupings (“Owners”, “Renters”, “Movers”, “Stayers”)
are defined in the same way as in Table 3. “High school degree, %” is the relative share
of household heads at least 25 years old that have 10 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 11, “College degree,
%” is the corresponding share of those that have 12 ≤ EDUC99 ≤ 17. Finally, “Age” and
“Income”, respectively, refer to the average age (AGE) and income (FTOTINC) over the
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relevant households in each case.
To compute the Gini coefficients in Table 5 we first restrict the sample to persons that
own their house (OWNERSHP = 10) and that have moved recently (MIGRATE5 = 2).
Within this subsample, we classify a person as a “short distance mover”, if his current
MSA is the same as five years ago, i.e., if METAREA and MIGMET5 match; otherwise
the person is classified as a “long distance mover”. In addition to data on persons that
have moved from one MSA region to another, we also use data on persons that have
moved from or to a non-MSA region. If a person has moved from an MSA region to a
non-MSA region, or vice versa, he or she is recorded as a “long distance movers”, while
a person that has moved between two non-MSA regions is recorded as a “long distance
mover” only, if his or her current state of residence (STATEFIP) is different from that five
years ago (MIGPLAC5). The Gini coefficients for age, education and income are formed
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Figure 4: Equilibrium pattern of residential sorting with different values of ε when θ is
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Tables




New York 5.3 12.0
Los Angeles 6.7 11.1
San Francisco 6.4 11.4
Source: Malpezzi, 1999
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Table 2. OLS regression estimates of the effect of house price volatility on population
structure and residential sorting
Independent variable DVEducation DVAge DVIncome GCEducation GCAge GCIncome
House price volatility −0.20 −0.12 −0.23 −0.28 −0.13 −0.31
(0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09)
Intercept 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (20.3) (0.01) (0.01)
Sample size 243 243 243 242 242 238
Notes: Dependent variable varies by column. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. Sample size indicates the number of MSA level observations. DVEducation,
DVAge and DVIncome indicate the measures in (1) computed for education (with
three groups), age (with five groups) and income (with 25 groups), respectively.
GCEducation, GCAge and GCIncome refer to the values of the Gini coefficients de-
fined in (2) for education, age and income, respectively. Precise definitions of the
groups in each case are given in the appendix.
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Table 3. Gini coefficients for movers and stayers
Owners Renters
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Education 0.28 0.24 0.29 0.31
Age 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.21
Income 0.37 0.28 0.31 0.41
Notes: The entries of the table refer to Gini coefficients computed for the whole US
using PUMA level data from the 1990 Census. Precise definitions of the groups in
each of the cases (education, age, income) are given in the appendix.
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Table 4. Comparing movers and stayers
Mean Std. deviation Tests for equal variance
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Levene Brown-F.
Owners
High School degree, % 0.45 0.46 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00
College degree, % 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.00
Age 42.3 56.2 3.3 3.0 0.00 0.02
Income 46039 42021 15503 13113 0.00 0.00
Renters
High School degree, % 0.48 0.45 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00
College degree, % 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.00
Age 37.6 53.0 2.5 4.8 0.00 0.00
Income 23405 21760 6924 6839 0.28 0.47
Notes: The entries of the table are computed using PUMA level observations (total
1726). Each PUMA observation is obtained by averaging relevant observations
(household heads) in the corresponding PUMA sample (from the 1990 Census). A
household head is classified as a mover (a stayer), if he or she did not live (lived)
in his or her current house five years ago. “High school degree, %” refers to the
share of persons with a high school degree but not a college degree, “College degree,
%” refers to the share of persons with at least a college degree, “Age” refers to
the average age in years, while “Income” refers to the average annual income of
household heads. (See the subsequent section for more detailed description of the
variables.) “Levene” and “Brown-F.”, respectively, refer to the p-values of the
Levene (1960) and Browne and Forsythe (1974) tests for the equality of variances.
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Table 5. Gini coefficients for long and short distance movers




Notes: The entries of the table refer to Gini coefficients computed for the whole
US using PUMA level data from the 1990 Census. Precise definitions of the groups
for each characteristic (education, age, income) are given in the appendix. “Short
distance movers” refer to households which have moved within the same MSA,
while “long distance movers” have migrated from another MSA. See the subsequent
section for more detailed definitions.
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